tv North Korea Nuclear Program CSPAN September 20, 2017 3:04pm-4:48pm EDT
insurance could be priced out of your reach. we must protect our care. once congress returns next week, reports say the senate will vote on the latest bill to change the healthcare law. watch live coverage on the house on c-span and the senate on c-span2. house and senate also expected to take up legislation reauthorizing funding a children's health program. we also expect them to take up faa program funding. both - and faa programs are set to expire on september 30. >> c-span, where history unfolds daily. in 1979, c-span was created as a public service by america's cable television companies. and is brought to you today by your cable or satellite provider. >> during his first address to the united nations yesterday, president trump urged the un to join together in stopping north korea's nuclear efforts. on monday, the center for national interest hosted a
panel discussion on us policy toward north korea. one of the speakers was part of the special envoy for party talks with north korea during george w. bush's administration. this discussion is almost 2 hours. >> ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. our session on north korea crisis, causes and cures. you may have noticed the large camera and the good looking fellow behind the camera there. you might deduce that we are on the record. we are actually live on c-span i am told. this will be a good session. i am honored to be accompanied by two good friends here that have some experience with north korea and can share their insights. to my right we have -- career intelligence official mandarin,
former special envoy to the six party talks, us are presented to the korean economic development agency, the associate director of national intelligence admissions manager for north korea and director of the national counter proliferation center and special advisor to the director of national intelligence. he has been trying to make sense of this problem to a lot of people. for a long time he is able to speak well of that.to my left, the executive director of the committee toward human rights in north korea. which induces a lot of interesting conversations. he was formerly with the korean economic institute in washington and he comes from a comes to us, his knowledge of communist governments honestly, he was raised in romania during the -- regime. he has a decided view on this. i like to start off with greg
and then we will ship to joe and as usual questions from the assembled group. thank you. >> thank you on the introduction. 28 years after the collapse of communism in eastern europe. the former soviet union regime, not only has this regime survives but it has developed a lot of terrifying weapons in the meantime. and it achieved two hereditary transmissions. from grandfather to son and son. and from kim jong-un to the grandson in december 2011. how did we get here? one argument that is made explaining the resilience of the kim regime is the fact that eastern european's had witnessed other political systems good, bad, terrible. in the case of north korea, regime, the system is truly the
result of the fusion of three totalitarian political systems. of course, there is a stalin communism, imperialism from 95 to 1945, korea was under a very tough brutal japanese imperial occupation. prior to that, 500 years the dynasty so one argument is made that this dynastic dictatorship that the kim family regime is truly the result of the fusion of three totalitarian political systems. what we know for sure is that this is a criminal regime. in february of 2014 they submitted a report with the results of an investigation. they submitted a report to the human rights council, they report that what is happening in north korea in particular in
the prison camps amounts to crimes against humanity. none of us have a perfect human rights record. many of us in the free world work hard on improving that record. there is only one country on the face of the planet where there are still political prison camps and that is north korea. there are 120,000 men, women and children being held at north korea's political prison camps. after three generations of the same family. a system of guilt by association both -- a system of feudal inspiration.this is the only country on the face of the planet that classifies its own citizens based on their perceived degree of loyalty to
the regime. the names are frightening, there is a class, 20 to 25 percent of the publishing. there is a wavering class 40 to 60 percent of the population, and hostile class and many of the classified as hostile are sent to political prison camps. many of them have been banished in the northeastern part of north korea. the abuse happening in north korea's detention facilities is absolutely unbelievable. we have had numerous accounts of public, starvation, execution, prisoners are subjected to labor and induced malnutrition. one can see this vast system of
unlawful imprisonment as truly the heart of the north korean regime. going back to the question, as to how this regime has managed to stay in power for so long. after this they will be celebrating the 70th anniversary of the establishment of the dprk. as mentioned earlier i was born in communist romania which was the one eastern european country that came closest to north korea, the two leaders were good friends. certainly, romania was a very oppressive regime and some of us for all of us still remember the notorious secret police. for a population of 23 million in 1989, they had the secret police with 14,000 agents.
pretty similar population of 25 million in north korea today. there are 270,000 agents of north korea's main internal security agencies. the state security department, this is the north korean gestapo. they have 50,000 agents. with ministry ups public security of course a police force that executes political police functions as well, 210,000 and the military security command whose mission is to keep an eye on officers, senior officers in particular, 10,000 agents. in romania they were half a million informers which is on the honor of the nation. in north korea, each and every individual has to become an informer and report on family,
friends, neighbors each and every north korean has to participate in the neighborhood watch system. each and every north korean has to participate in weekly indoctrination sessions. where people confess to their trespasses, they engage in a robust session of self-criticism, alleging to strengthen ideological -- others criticize them and this goes on and on and on. the life of a north korean is lived under an overwhelmingly level of coercion, control, surveillance and punishments. which means that the level of social cohesion is very low. it is very difficult for people
to get together to organize and discuss sports even. forget about politics. north korea, although the situation has changed to a certain extent and i will mention that in a few minutes. north korea continues to restrict very severely information coming into the country and also information getting out of the country. one thinks budapest, 1956, prague in 1968, bucharest 19 89. what was the age of the revolution, the late teens, early 20s. perhaps mid-20s. at the age of the revolution, each and every young man in north korea is in a military uniform for 10 years. ages 17 through age 27. also many of the women spend six years in a military uniform.
i have spoken with numerous north koreans whose sons have come back on the military after having spent 10 years there and they all say that although they had lived under the permanent indoctrination by the regime, the level of indoctrination that the sons had been subjected to was frightening. even to a north korean living in north korea. by the time they are of the military, the age of revolution has already passed. of course, i would be stating and restating the obvious if i said that north korea today is different from north korea 10 or 20 years ago as we all remember. in the mid-to-late 1990s, between its hundred thousand and 3 million north koreans starved to death or died of disease induced by
malnutrition. this happened, the main reason behind this great tragedy that affected the people in north korea was that mild international aid was coming and, they came regime chose to focus its resources on its fundamentals strategical objectives that i know the ambassador will mention later which is of course, as you all know by now, survival. of course, this regime does not want its people to die by the millions. but, if that is what it takes, in order to stay in power than it will do it in the blink of an eye. this is what happened in the 1990s. ever since, if i may say so, there have been some positive side effects first and foremost, many more north koreans have escaped the country. as of a couple of weeks ago, there were 30,800 north korean
defectors living in south korea. there are 220 north korean defectors here in the united states and elsewhere. they have played an extraordinarily important role. through them, we have learned the stories of north korea. through them, we have learned the truth about what is happening in north korea. after all, i will take the liberty of saying that the work that organizations such as ours do, is the work that the came regime fears the most. we find out the truth and we tell the truth about north korea. this regime does care about its pocketbook. it also cares about the legitimacy. if we bring up nuclear weapons once, we should bring up human rights five times. every time we address nuclear weapons, i am not exactly an avid reader of this but i do read the news every day it is
similar, it doesn't take that much time. nuclear weapons have become an essential part of this very identity of the regime. it fills up pages and pages of propaganda with articles about a nuclear capability, nuclear weapons in the constitution and every time we mention human rights at the un or other international forum, this results in undermining the legitimacy of the regime. i think one has the mind that yes, indeed, the fundamental objective of this regime is survival.but this is an absolute monopoly on power. inside north korea, there are no competitors.it is the kim regime and only the kim regime. the main competitor is south korea. free, democratic, prosperous, republic of korea.
as preposterous as this may sound, this regime understands that the only long-term guarantee of its own survival is to establish transport over the entire korean peninsula. have we seen any positive developments in recent years for the past two decades? basically, during the days of -- the kim regime the monetized the regime by replacing money as a means of exchange with russians. during the days of the great famine the regime was no longer able to feed its people with the public distribution system. small markets were established so ever since for the past two decades, we have seen a process of informal marketization in north korea. there are farmers markets, lack markets, open markets, many
more people depend on the markets today than they do on the public distribution system which is still active for those living in the capital city. those elites, most of north korea's elites live in the capital city. you will see pictures of buildings actually constructed on kim jong-un's watch. they are quite impressive one might say. and of course i also have the memories of romania where there was a lot of construction but very little economic utility to that construction. the regime as kim jong-un has invested heavily in these high profile projects such as buildings in the capital city and at the same time, if one takes a look of pictures from one year ago, if you remember typhoon lion rock affected
north korea quite seriously i vividly remember pictures published in north korea's propaganda, pictures of men participating in recovery efforts. they had no tools. not a shovel, not a hammer, forget about tractors, forget about anything else. this is how the regime of kim jong-un operates. by concentrating, focusing old resources first and foremost on those aspects that are critical to its survival and not on the ordinary people of north korea. speaking of the markets, of course not having to depend on the public distribution system, they regime not being able to absolutely control its own people through the distribution of food is certainly a positive development. the other positive development
induced by the markets is that social dynamics are somehow changing in north korea. slowly, but surely in the past, life used to be centered on two places. the workplace and their place of residence.the workplace is always a sign. nobody gets to choose this in north korea. the place of residence is defined by the workplace. everyone has to be employed. in north korea everyone has to punch in and punch out. men participate in a lot of public mobilization campaigns that is primarily why women are the main actors involved in north korea's markets. going back to social dynamics, this is not a society that thrives on trust. actually, the distrust is everywhere. however, since there are no,
there is nowhere to lend or borrow money, there are no banks available to those actives of these markets, although these market transactions basically goods coming from china, so that wholesale markets. and wholesale markets in the provinces, retail markets. most of these transactions are executed based on trust. so perhaps one interesting development that will begin to take time in north korea is that a bit of trust, more than before is developing in personal relationships. that is not to say that the regime of kim jong-un is less of a human rights denier than that of the father or the grandfather. my organization, committee for human rights in north korea has
identified several trends in human rights under the kim jong-un regime.we have identified these trends based on a research methodology that can provide satellite imagery, testimony from those inside the country and in this day and age, given technological advances that we can benefit from, we even have access to sources inside of the country. we have all heard about the purge that has been going on in north korea since early 2009. when the kim regime began proceeding with preparations for the second hereditary transmission of power. according to a think tank with defectors, the institute for national security strategy during the first five years of the kim jong-un regime, 340 senior officials were purged or executed.
remember, this is a humongous bureaucracy. it is more than one individual. it is the entire bureaucratic support structure, it's friends, associates, family, the favorite method of execution on kim jong-un's watch is execution by antiaircraft machine gun system. hrnk managed to acquire a satellite image of such an execution taken just minutes before. you're talking about a machine gun system of four machine gun barrels, 50 caliber, automatic fire. human bodies are just polarized. they have turned into pink mist. remember, this is still a confucian society. of course, the old elites were exterminated. people of religion were exterminated.
christians were exterminated. new elites were created. it is still a confucian mindset and these officials were executed are even denied the fundamental right of leaving a body behind. north korea is a member of the united nations, thus bound by the declaration of human rights. it has ratified several human rights instruments including international covenant on civil and political rights. the international covenant on economic, social and cultural rights. the women's convention, the children's convention and yet, each and every conceivable human right is violated in north korea. north korea has zero diplomatic credibility. given all of the engagement that it has broken. as far as we are concerned, human rights organizations, we will continue to tackle the toughest issues first.
the most difficult of all issues in north korea is surely it's vast system of unlawful imprisonment. north korea's political prison camp system and if i may use the same terminology, what we aim for, what we want to see is the complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement of north korea's gulags. thank you. >> with that will go to the ambassador. >> we are still talking about this.thank you. general and the center for the national interest, thank you for the invitation. this is a very, obviously a very important subject. one that is being discussed as we speak at the united nations general assembly meeting the
president will be speaking to the general assembly tomorrow typically north korea. let me just follow up on what greg and his outstanding presentation. it was focused on human rights, criminality, illicit behavior. we just follow on that and then i will go into what i would really like to get a little more deeply into. in september, 2005 we had a joint statement agreement with north korea. 19 september to be exact. it took a number of years to come up with this joint statement. it speaks to north korea and committing to comprehensive, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement of all the nuclear programs. we made that very clear to the north koreans and in return for that, they would be getting the security insurances, economic and provision of transfer when they returned to the non-wood
nuclear weapons estate. and that was not, i remember many discussions or at least a few with the north koreans it said wait a minute, if we denuclearize company actively you're saying that it does not lend itself to normal relationships with the united states. because this was, and i believe still is, a major objective. normalizing relationships with the united states. and i said no, there are other issues. these are bilateral issues. the work, and it will be actions for actions, not immediately denuclearization but as north korea moves toward that they would get the benefits certainly security assurances. eventually other things. but we said there are other issues. the abductee issue, very powerful. separating families and for the united states further to greg's comments. human rights.
we need transparency on human rights issues. we need to see some progress on what you are doing on human rights. because that is part of our value system. rest of normal relationships with the country, those are important elements. the counterfeiting of the $100 note, pharmaceuticals, this is criminal behavior. we need to see progress indeed, elimination. but indeed, progress, transparency. then i would lend itself. then these become bilateral discussions. but the opening up would be again, september where they committed to this dismantlement.for those deliverables that are important for north korea. so i could not agree with you more on the human rights issue. and it has always been a strong core element of our dialogue
with north korea. that the nuclear gets us into the core issues that touch on values as a nation. and indeed on the nations at the table. south korea, japan, certainly their allies russia and china. that september 2005, let me go back a few years because it took us about two years to get to that point. because the first meeting of the six party talks was in august 2003. i remember that vividly because in april 2003, we were at a very tense point with north korea. a tipping point. north korea was transfer that took out of the cooling ponds. it was the end of the agreed framework, they pulled out of the npt. they made it very clear and told us, you didn't have to do much intelligence on the issues because they tell you.
and they were doing that. and it was the secretary of state that went to his counterpart in beijing and said this is getting very tense. and the chinese spoke to the north koreans and that was a dialogue that happened in april 2005. which established the six party process. so the north koreans came to the table with china, united states, we discussed it and it was the beginning of the six party process. the first meeting i mentioned was in august. i remember one of my first meetings at the six party talks. it was a statement that rings very true today as it did in 2003. where north korea tentatively said, mr. joseph detrani, except the fact that we will be in nuclear weapons date. why don't you, the americans, need to understand that. and accept that. and we could be a good friend
of the united states if you accept that. and look at pakistan, the relationship there. he put that on the table. ladies and gentlemen, they have not walked away from that issue. as greg indicated it is part of the constitution now. the economic development and in nuclear weapons estate. and they are pursuing that. that has been their goal. and the sense that one has an let me just go back to the 2005 statement, it is all part of the end of 2008. for a very clear reason. we expected our monitors who were going to monitor and verify the adherence to the commitments to denuclearize, move towards that that they would not permit transport we have the commitment orally but we wanted it in writing. they would not put it in writing and that was the beginning of the end. we said if you cannot put that in writing we cannot have our monitors going to verify,
compliance with this joint statement. then we really don't have anything. we do not have the trust and so forth. that was the beginning of the end of the joint statement. as it was, we go right past 1994 with huge framework. the end of that was in 2002 when north korea was confronted with the iranian enrichment program.which, they admitted to having, basically telling our representatives that we have things and basically, there is not much you can do about it. so it speaks to the north koreans even with the framework and what was being built and they still wanted a second pass for nuclear weapons. and then in 2005 we have a joint statement, the sense was that they weren't committed to track where they were in total compliance leave then to confirm the areas. so they were pieces there that speak to where we are today in 2017. 25 years. negotiations. and we have had the framework,
the joint statement but also we have the process, form security of state meeting with kim jong-un. we have devised marshall in the white house meeting with the president. we had some significant developments but they eventually all fell apart. as it is right now, as we have experienced over this past few missile launches, intercontinental ballistic missiles, to intermediate range ballistic missiles, now the icbms that have a reach of the united states. irb m's that have a reach of 46,000 kilometers which could reach guam. kim jong-un spoke about that. marine launched ballistic missiles. we have seen this, the sixth
nuclear test.a very significant one. north korea claims it was a thermonuclear event. thermonuclear. very very significant. and the sensitive minister nuclear warheads. and it is a question of being at the cost, ensuring that the reentry vehicle will not burn up when they reenter the atmosphere. and at that point they become an existential nuclear threat to the united states. as a been in threat to south korea and japan for the last number of years. this is a critical issue. our president and all others are right on the market. saying that we are at a tipping point. this is an issue. but as north korea also, they have pursued very vigorously, we saw this with sony pictures, our alleys and south korea service with the banking system.
all different -- south korea. we are talking about a very tense.. think of where we are right now. when it is up to 40 nuclear warheads, some supported to 60, some say by 2020 they can have 100 nuclear warheads. that are miniature. with a delivery system. and this is north korea. a north korea that has sold nuclear technology to countries like syria. we saw this when israelis in 2007, september 2007 check out a -- we have seen this with the missile transfers to iran, libya, syria.
this is to make money. make money. this is what keeps their nuclear program going, and the missile program going. getting the revenue's necessary. i am a believer in sanctions. i think we all are the united nations for the sanctions, will they resolve the nuclear issue? sanctions get north korea to denuclearize comprehensively, irreversibly? i think some of us and i'm one of them say no. sanctions bite and it touches them. i think the last security council resolution was a very powerful one. about 30 percent if you will, of their refined and crude oil that comes it is north korea is being restricted. basically, textiles, they cannot sell. we are talking about $750 million of textiles etc. so it does bite but will it stop them? no. what we need to be doing, a joint military exercise, these
are irritants to north korea. they maintain joint military exercises with allies and south korea. not only are irritants but they are a prelude to innovation. decapitation of the leadership. what we have set the decades we have had these joint military exercises.and when you say why defensive? when you look back, you know back to 1966 when they attacked, they had a commando group going at the blue house in south korea. we can go back to burma, 1983 when they had a commando team that went into takedown the leadership of south korea was visiting burma at that time. korean airlines in 1988, so there are a number of issues that speak to, yes! why defensive? 47 sailors in 2010, yes! joint defensive military exercises, that is why too many
of us, i think almost all of us in this room would say it is very distasteful for china and russia to put on the table the succession of these joint military exercises with our allies and south korea if we want north korea to halt, to freeze the missile launches and nuclear tests. it is just not comparable. it is not comparable. those with missile launches and nuclear tests are in violation of us security council resolutions and one of the 193 nations in the united nations say no, about our secretary of state, rex tillerson has said very clearly, the us is prepared to sit down with north korea. and talk about these issues. and listened to the concerns. but we all want to do that without a gun to our head. we do not want to do that when they're launching missiles and having nuclear tests. stop what you're doing and if we have exploratory talks are
gone for a day then we have the stuff for one day. if it goes on for a week, stuffer a week. but at least have some timelines and during those exploratory talks, make a decision whether it would be possible to reconstitute negotiations with north korea. certainly to include our allies, china, russia and maybe expand it. maybe expand it. but is that possible? exploratory, not while north korea is launching missiles or having nuclear tests. that is been put on the table which i think is a very progressive proposal. it is not a condition to stop nuclear tests. and missile launches while you are talking to your -- i mean that is called common courtesy. now north korea has not picking up on that.we have not accepted a freeze and we've seen where north korea is going
with their icbms. as you mentioned there at the cusp of getting what they want which is the ability to deliver and intercontinental ballistic missile to the united states and ensuring that the reentry, now i say ensuring the reentry vehicle, is that it not burn up on reentry, that is looking at a best case scenario. there is a scientific approach. if you are more tests of tree can do that but that doesn't mean that's was going to happen. it does not mean they're going to just test it. when we hear the president saying, options are on the table, that is pretty understandable. you have a country that in one year, has more missile launches than the last 10. that has had what it looks like thermonuclear event, tests. we're talking over hundred 20, and events.
and china has seen this. on that event. and we are seeing a country that is not tevid. his uncle was executed with the antiaircraft weapons. his half-brother in kuala lumpur. what are we talking about ladies and gentlemen? i do not doubt kim jong-un is a rational actor from where he sits but from where we sit we have to be very mindful of the threat that he poses to our allies and to the united states and globally, globally.there is another piece to nuclear weapons we all know that. as i mentioned, when the guy mentioned illicit activity to make money. certainly, nuclear weapons in north korea. this is i think my many and i'm certainly one of them maintain
accepting north korea as a nuclear weapons state would be a disaster. it would be a disaster. because we are going to get nuclear proliferation. certainly south korea, japan and even taiwan. they're not just going to sit there.we have an extended nuclear commitment to our allies and they know that. but the fact of the matter is with north korea retaining the nuclear weapons i think there will be an impetus. and we see that now to get your own return capability our own nuclear deterrent capability. and that is a reality. when you look at that. but there's also another reality of miscalculation, misinformation, confusion or the sale of the proliferation issue ladies and gentlemen. proliferation issues. that is what -- there was no doubt in my mind that there is money transacted.
and now, the possibility of nuclear weapons, it is out there accidentally or purposely or what have you. this is not where we want to go. let me end on this point. when the president says options are on the table, i mentioned secretary of state, rex tillerson, offering exploratory talks to see if negotiations can be because a deeper just do not launch missiles or have nuclear tests while we are having these discussions. north korea is not there, maybe because they want to prove that they have the capability of being a real existential nuclear threat to the us but that is that. the other option there is they have these missiles and nuclear warheads. they have the victory statements that come out of pyongyang. and in 1993 making soul is city of ashes but in this case making the united states a sea of ashes. and if you will, the nuclear event going on in washington and so forth.
also tokyo and what have you. preemptive strikes indeed, if there is a missile launch, which is viewed as an imminent threat to the united states or an ally, i think it is pretty clear certainly to me and i believe some people in the room here. that not only is this something we should do but we have an obligation. to protect our nation and our people, our allies. their people, if it is an imminent threat. international law, there is no ambiguity in that. there is an imminent threat, you have that not only authority obligation to do something, to me that is a preemptive strike. if there is a missile launch in north korea has to understand this very clearly, it is no way that the us will sit here with our allies. that is what we have missile defense out there. so we have the joint military exercises. lesser sanctions are trying to convince north korea to seize the missile launches and
nuclear tests and so forth. so far to no avail. but preemptive going after a launch of that nature makes imminent sense. and north korea has to understand that. with a declaratory policy pretty direct to that then there will be further consequences on that and so forth. so all options are on the table which makes this a very critical period. for all of those reasons. let me just and on this. although, nuclear weapons are part of the constitution with the economic development, and we see the markets, the private markets and so forth because of public distribution system not working. nuclear weapons are there, economic development is there and so forth.the opportunity now to come back because of north korea is still committed and still wants very dearly to have normal relations with the united states which they said they wanted in 2006, my
personal view having met with the north koreans, and i continue to meet with them informally, they do want a normal relationship with the united states. they do! but they wanted on their terms. except that this is the nuclear weapons, they say will behave and who will be good. and i believe that is the case right now and i've heard that close to one year ago. when i met with them. we will be a good friend of the united states. effective matter is that we are saying, you could be a good friend of the united states. and our allies. if you behave and it does not come with nuclear weapons. and it does not come with a list of activities. it does not come with abusive human rights violations. thank you. >> well, joseph detrani, greg scarlatoiu, thank you for the presentations. we can tell that not only their deep experience with north korea sitting here at the front table but there is deep emotion attached to this.
we will open up for questions now. i will put the reminder out again, we are on the record. matter of fact we are on tv. i would ask if you want to ask a question or make a comment, let me know somehow and tell us who you are and what your affiliation is and we will go from there. thank you very much. >> thank you gentlemen for your presentation. i'm a strategist for the u.s. navy. we were talking about mr. kim being a rational actor. looking at the other side of the coin we can look at this as a domestic problem for economic development. with is that he talks a good game but is abject to failure. what does this do to his mentality? does it have any effect at all do we does not care? >> let me just go on that. i think he views himself as a non-failure. he views himself as a significant success and is looking for legacy as a young man of 33 or 34.
he is establishing north korea with nuclear weapons, the ninth nuclear weapons estate. he probably feels he is at the cusp of getting us to recognize and accept. we realize what he has been accepted that he has a nuclear weapons, that they are a nuclear weapons estate or at the table. he feels he is at the cost and i think that plays into the economic issue that greg so eloquently spoke about. he is permitting those private markets. it is reminiscent of china in the 70s with the cultural revolution. to let that go on because the public distribution isn't doing it. i think that kim is feeling pretty good about himself right now. >> given that we have seen this massive purchase, practically all four fundamental big building blocks of the kim regime have been purged. military, the korean people's army, the party, internal security agencies and even the
-- both the uncle executed, the half-brother, assassinated with nerve agent and an international airport. those around kim jong-un will be afraid to deliver bad news to the supreme leader. and this might result in miscalculation. kim jong-un, not being able to accurately assess those accomplishments that he is sucking on along the line. >> yes, sir. [inaudible] >> preemptive war was mentioned of course in a situation where we have thought an immediate threat, that has been talked about preemptive war to safely deny north korea the ability to
strike the united states with an icbm. do either of you think that that is a realistic option? what would that scenario look like, how do we -- is that realistic? >> the term i was using is preemptive and that would be preemptive strike against an imminent threat. an emphasis on imminent threat. going left of that will be prevented strike. to prevent them from having the capability of doing anything of threatening a preventive strike on that. a declaratory policy, for the
missile launches that they have had accessible, and nuclear tests that they had. i think anyone has advised kim jong-un, if there some advising him. i do think that he would understand that the us will not just sit there and is obligated and we will not just sit there to have that permit that to happen. something will be done to intercept or destroy that threat. that is the preemption side. preventing is going to north korea to prevent them from having that capability. he threatened an ally for the united states. and i think on the preemption side, kim jong-un would have to be very cautious at how he responds. he might do it through cyber or he may do something, but he needs to understand that he is provoking a response. a necessary response and so forth. preventive side, where you are going in and going after infrastructure.
to deny the capability of threatening and so forth is something else. i think that kim jong-un on then becomes more of his own player. he becomes more of a actor whom we really cannot understand his reaction. my personal view on that would be, he and his military people would react in a very significant way. it would be probably more indicative of the fact that they feel they have been threatened significantly and attacked in a way. having said that, i think kim jong-un and those advising him have to understand, he is at the point now where others would make the case that you cannot just wait for an
imminent threat because that imminent threat, which have to be dealt with, is, are you waiting too long? if you know eventually there will be an imminent threat, do you have to respond before hand to prevent that from happening? i think that is the issue right now. where we are going into a different category.i'm not just prevention but prevention from those and from and after who possibly or likely would be doing something of an imminent nature that would threaten us or our allies. >> let me try and add something on this also. since at least 1993, we have gone through the same cycle of options every time north korea acts out and it has caused a great analyst in the situation to characterize north korea's land of lousy options.
one is preventive attacked which we think is too costly than his negotiations and agreements but they cheat on those. then there are sanctions. we always seem to settle on sanctions as the saved resort but i think there is an argument that if sanctions are truly effective, then they by definition are affecting the stability and the longevity of the regime. so you get to another very risky situation. and another interesting question to contemplate is that our allies, the republic of korea and japan have been under an existential threat for quite some time. we are now fully exercise because of the imminence of an existential threat to the united states. so it induces a question of if our allies continue to believe and the guarantees are
extending deterrence, what are we doing to make sure they believe that this is rocksolid? i think there is a case to be made that the onset of a ballistic missile, nuclear threat to the united states, fundamentally changes things. so we need to take other actions to sure up. it is famously stating include into the chinese that if you cannot or will not help us to restrain north korea, then we, the united states, have no other alternative but to enhance our alliance capabilities. you may find that destabilizing but this is not about you, this is about our us interest and we are going to stand by our allies. that means moving capabilities there and enhancing our alliance capabilities to guarantee that we are doing the
best we can to protect our allies against this same threat that we find so discomforting to the united states. there are no easy answers to this thing. but greg mentioned earlier, one thing, greg mentioned earlier about more information getting into north korea. it is interesting that in the wake of the -- there was a very large degree of political unrest in south korea. they were angry at the government for not having any response options to publications. so provocation options were developed. the next incident was the placement of landmines that maimed some soldiers. they chose to employ and retaliate for that deadly force
incident was to turn the loudspeakers on the dmz back on.north koreans reacted very vigorously. this bothered them. from a small wedge, maybe there is a crack that we can develop here. more and more information getting into north korea may be one of the hopes that we have for change. greg spoke eloquently about human rights, so did joe. one of the strongest suits that we have is pushing that because we are speaking to populations by going right past their leadership, and autocratic society that is -- we are the country that stared down the soviet union over decades. deterrence may be amongst all of the military options available, strengthening our deterrence may be the best option. but it remains to be seen.
>> if i may add to that, when it comes to information campaigns i think that true change, it is difficult to imagine as it might become a true change can only come from the people of north korea themselves. we need to tell them three fundamental stories. the story of the outside world. especially the story of free prosperous democratic south korea.
[inaudible] i'm still casting about. and just to, what strikes me, a lot of talk about preemptive strikes of one sort of another. i wonder if that horse is out of the barn, too late rex because you put the number of nuclear weapons that the north has now that are usable, doesn't take much imagination to even see a very quote-unquote successful preventive strike on the installations and all that, creating a desperate sort of we will bring the house down around us mentality. you start having nuclear weapons going off in south korea. the level of carnage and damage
that's fully credible under eating military scenario strikes me as just off the charts. if the military scenario is a bible at all it's probably viable for a few weeks. at what point did north koreans announced they've mastered the reentry shielding they can now bring a missile debt on new york city and they will demonstrate it a shot our people can re-examine its a yes, they have achieved that. at that point it's over in terms of preemptive strike. what you are left with is either basically cutting a deal very much on kim jong-un said terms of okay, we will give you certain recognitions on, in the name of preventing some absolute catastrophe, or you end up with a mutual assured destruction, heavy investment in missile defense and basically hunker
down and essentially present kim jong-un with the message okay,, you've been successful, you develop all the systems, they are not strategically worth much because we now have credible defensive capabilities that we can basically neutralize it. that's the sort of on the avenue left, it strikes me. >> kallick, of that? it was a good point. north korea makes it very clear that their nuclear come to use the term nuclear deterrent, they are building their nuclear deterrent. and they made a very clear sense 2003 when they got on this path the building nuclear weapons, that their nuclear arsenal is to is for deterrence purposes when you're sitting down with them went to look at what they say what you're doing but when you sit down with them they are saying this vitriolic
commentary, this is hyperbolic rhetoric. what we have to believe what you have, if you're threatening the u.s. and its allies and your launching missiles and your nuclear events and what we have to believe that and went to take, you're right on, missile defense, joint military exercises, sanctions that are buying information, secretary sanctions that as north korea becomes more isolated and that's where the u.n. comes in and the international community writ large, they become that much more isolated. let the event is there truly alienated child to pick we haven't mentioned china in this discussion so far practices of the china is very please with obviously. not only because of the 19th party congress, up next month but because this man has been disrespectful to the prc and to president xi jinping and totally discounts the concerns that are coming there. china has a lot of leverage, and
that was the last sanctions if we are talking about the crude oil, over 90% from china, we find oil. 85-90% of straight so forth. there's something china can get theinto the table and so forth. i guess i think we do have that option as the joe said anything that's approach we're taking. let me just say this. many of the analyst will defend with great insight if they launch and a meal and a nuclear warhead on that, that's the end of the country and i think they understand that. as great said so well before, survival is key for that nation. however, when your commander-in-chief and your to look at the realities, not what your assessment is and so forth. we had to consider all those options, all those pieces that are on the table. i guess that's the value of exploratory, though most people would say why negotiations again? we failed after 1994, failed in 2005. 2000 with the secretary of state
visit and why would you even consider that? well, what we want to do is stop the process. i think it's kind of logical, you don't want them having another nuclear test brigitta within of another icbm launched for an irbm and so forth because as you just said so correctly, the possibility of miscalculation is there an effective precipitate something. >> you didn't mention your visit to north korea with bill clint clinton. >> well, much of that was involved with president clinton's visit to get the two journalists back. i think this is something that kim jong-il at the time one of if you wanted to visit of the former president, a president in fact, he thought is making progress with when they had secretary albright visit and
vice president joe's visit to the white house. i think that was, so for kim jong-il i think those important visit of a former president clinton. >> looks like it was our -- yes, ma'am. >> what do you think of the possibility of or the message for obtaining deconfliction conversations with china, an event -- [inaudible] both odyssey to make sure we don't touch off world war iii with china but also a means of pressure north korea? if you don't think they should use means it to pressure north korea, the potential -- [inaudible] obviously classified but not public. >> let me restart the question. we had our chairman, chairman of the joint chiefs, general dunford who is in chandigarh secretary mattis, sector rex
tillerson. a lot of discussions with the chinese on that. certainly our ambassador to united nations has been discussing it with our counterpart. a lot of discussion with the chinese. certainly chinese are not happy with what's been going on with north korea. so there's a lot going on. but a lot that's public. i'm sure there's a lot that's not public which is encouraging. that's all positive. china pressuring north korea, i'm not sure if pressure is the right word. i don't think kim jong-un response to well to pressure from china. i think you showing independence and how he is his own person. but i think china could truly using economic terms put the pressure your mentioning yes, if you cut back on the crude oil going into north korea, i mean, that's key. it wasn't coincidental that in 2003 when the north koreans came to the table for talks with the
u.s. to start the six-party process, for whatever reason they said mechanical reasons, a pipeline from china to north korea providing the crude oil was inoperative. there was possibly another incentive. my personal view i think china can get north korea to the table jeff exploratory talks. >> dimitri. >> this is a frustrating topic from the stance of -- [inaudible] because our lifetime venture, increasingly endangered and looking for a solution. unfortunately, the information -- happened to be a tragedy. otherwise we would never die. otherwise we will always stay healthy and wealthy. but there are no good solutions. they are thinking about hesitation, the united states found itself in in 1949, 1950,
eisenhower who is a student of nonproliferation and soviet nuclear strategy i'm sure knows a lot about that. -- atomic bomb and the nuclear bomb. [inaudible] to what we see today in north korea. they do not deserve to have nuclear weapon. and with their conventional superiority in europe they hardly needed. a nuclear weapon for defensive purposes. that is strong argument could be made that we have to do something, preventive, preemptive, whatever. and, of course, our life in europe, we are as concerned about -- as to their daily lives in japan and south korea.
we didn't do it. we know why we didn't do it, because we couldn't. we couldn't without an acceptable risk of major military confrontation in europe. and the solution was -- [inaudible] it was not a happy solution. senator mccarthy said it was like prison, and was accusing a lot of people including general marshall, almost of being traitors. but it just was discovered your grandfather acknowledged that this was the terms is only practical solution available. add if we strengthen deterrence, and today combines the terms with sanctions, come to achieve a lot of things we really need. not everything we want, but what we really need.
in combination with sanctions satisfy our minimal requirements. >> greg, do you want to take a swing at this? >> well, from where i stand, a specialist since you made the comparison in eastern europe, certainly this is one possibility that will be on the table, but going back to the content of my presentation earlier today, how do we accept i kim regime that is doing all of these terrible things to its own people, perhaps on a scale much greater than what was happening during the stalinist days in the soviet union? how can there be any semblance of trust if we were to choose this path of effective deterrence. when we leave the other issues
completely off the table? when we address them? would it be done under what context? perhaps under the context of something along the lines of the helsinki accords. in that case, wouldn't that just simply further legitimize the kim regime? >> can i just, it, i think that's a very good point at a don't disagree with you. i totally agree. i think deterrence is very important. there's always that possibility. we had the extended deterrence connotes to our allies in south korea and japan. i think there will be an impetus there in south korea and japan to other own nuclear weapons capabilities. i think we see that dialogue starting right now. i think other countries may be saying we need our own deterrence capabilities because that's the reality. i think our ability been to not only isolate north korea but
watching cosignature there's no proliferation is another issue. so, yes, i think that's a possibility. the negatives on that would be the potential of a nuclear arms race, potential for proliferation, miscalculation, what have you. we are looking at the id what we talk about complete verifiable reversible dismantling, north korea is not there. they say they will retain the nuclear weapons that all analysts are even say they are not giving it up. we are hoping i think with the talks to stop it and maybe to see determine if there is a path to moving forward. there could be the interval pat greg alludes to a book about a minute ago. truth is we don't know the dynamics within north korea. some of these people were limited. why? were they not loyal? did have a different point of view? did he want to continue to be isolated and be used as a pariah state? when information gets in a look at their brothers and south
korea they say my god, why not us? there's some other imperatives of their that may come to fruition from within the country itself. >> admiral? >> last year i was able to participate in a conference in europe in which north korean officials were present. that's always an experience in and of itself. but one of the comments that caught everybody's attention from the leader of north korean delegation was the matter of fact assertion and statement that you don't understand, we have the united states deterred. and when you reflect upon that,
in fact, i think that probably is right, over what, for decades now, whenever north korea has done something outrageous we've never laid a glove on them. nor have the south koreans to speak of. as a former naval officer, the snatching at the pueblo comes to mind as one that, other than posturing, we postured, has never had a consequences. so it's not surprising that north korea after all these decades have come to the judgment that indeed we do have the americans deterred, and the south koreans for the very good reason that dimitri just laid out. the consequences of taking action runs the risk of restarting and other korean war with a terrible loss of life. and so while joe's argument to try to get some sort of negotiation makes perfectly good
sense, we ought not stop talking, it strikes me that we need to also make sure as best we can that the north koreans think that we have been deterred, and through either exercises, i nuclear posture review that undoes the last posture review the tried reduce the salience of nuclear weapons and perhaps we talk about what would happen if north korea uses nuclear weapon and say it in a way that is not cloaked in ambiguous language but it varies specific of those sorts of things to try to make pyongyang less self-assured, that, in fact, there would be really, really bad consequences and
spell goes out in ways that were unmistakable to begin to make sure, to begin the discussion of making sure they understand that we think there are also deterred. deterred. >> that's a good point. >> hang on. jim. >> thank you, mike. >> on the retired diplomat -- i am a retired u.s. diplomat. to take this path of deterrence and containment a bit further, what does of u.s. policy of containment and deterrence and pie for north korea's enabler? or to put carefully what do you think china has to do now to end up on the right side of containment? what you think about the deterrent effects of convincing pyongyang that we actually are deterring them? won'what those have still affecn
china, and their reaction to the south koreans. >> i think those are excellent points. i think china, on the sanctions side, it's a big country, we know that but there are banks and entities there that they need to ensure that they are not deal with north korea on illicit type transactions, to to estimate the sanctions. so there's no way the u.s. could do that. we've done it with the bank and others but this is china's issue. when they see the secondary sanctions i think china, i think we have with their correct attention as you think anyone see this as malicious. this is something we could do to contain north korea to ensure the sanctions are abiding and so forth. i think your points are right on. i think what you're getting at and i think it's really salient,
look, china can't be happy with the enhancing bad nuclear missile defense capabilities in the region. joint military exercises that are not only enhanced but include japan and possibly australia, bring a strategic forces, more strategic forces into the region. these are not issues that china wants to see. this goes against, this is up at the what. when you look at the south china sea, the east tennessee, they are domestic issues. so many things. i think many would say this because more of an imperative for jen to be even more proactive since they are implementing the coal and some of the other sanctions but even more proactive on all aspects to any entity in china deal with north korea. but also using the leverage thet because they do have leverage
with 90% of the crude oil, 85% trade, et cetera, they do have leverage with north korea. using some of that leverage to get north korea to come i hate to use the term because i know this is -- when you say this to the north koreans, to better behaved. they don't like that. it's like speaking to a child. they don't like that, better behaved. i think north korea has to understand is not a question of behaving. it's a question of threatening your ally, your neighbors, the region, the united states and that's the behavior we're talking about of a normal nationstate. i think china continues to be key. china is key but what china is telling us that we are seeing this now, we have to be more proactive. strategic patience had its place made initially after 2008 when the north koreans didn't want to sign and verification monitoring agreement. now the u.s. needs to be much more proactive on that because leaving north korea, when you're not talking to the north
koreans, i think if anyone did a study on north korea when you see when no one is negotiating talking to the north koreans they are on thei on the own pat. their building more nuclear weapons, launching missiles. and you have them at the table you are sitting there at least during those periods of time they are somewhat contained. in that regard. i think there's some value again getting back to china using is leverage to get to the table. and then deterrence and all the other things that dimitri you mentioned. >> now that we product china, it's a perfect invitation for an intervention by ambassador roy. >> thank you. i'm actually not going to give direct with china although it's part of the problem though. thanks very much for the terrific presentations. you have convincingly established we deal with a very bad regime in north korea.
but you've also convincingly demonstrated that it's probably the most frustrating foreign-policy problem we face. because, and like frustrating problems, it's generate a lot of nonsense. with all sorts of fantastic concepts of how we can deal with the question and a refusal in many cases to face up to the reality. the reason why china doesn't provide the convincing answer to it is, it's crystal clear that the north korean nuclear program is designed as a deterrent to the united states which is he this principle threat to it. and we convincingly keep reminding them that we are the principal threat because we keep putting military options on the table either implicitly as in the bush administration where we talked about unilateral action and preemptive action, and currently where we talk about
how military options are out there. so we currently need some additional thinking about this. some thoughts just to put out on the table. the first requirement is trying to stabilize the situation. because if you can't talk about deterrence and containment effectively if you have an unstable situation. to get a stable situation yes to captive programs, meaning into some out get a halt to nuclear testing and missile testing. you can't get that simply through sanctions, and less miraculously the north koreans change their behavior or collapse, which is probably not a good policy assumption to proceed on. together, therefore, you to give them something. and here are the contradictions. you can't get the denuclearization except within a realistic timeframe, and that time permits probably decades,
not months, years. it's decades because it requires essentially whether the regime changes, the attitudes of the regime has to change. they have to be willing to consider the trade-offs between giving up a no longer necessary deterrent because of the threat is going to be removed at the economic benefits that they can take advantage of if they had a regime that could effectively open up to the outside world, which they don't have. so, therefore, they can't get the economic benefits now because the regime can take advantage of that. your priorities have to be stabilization, and that means half of the program has to be up there and we keep taking off the table key elements that has to go into getting a cap. we say we can't talk about exercises, we can't talk about this and that any other thing and so end up with the same contradictions that for 20 years
prevented us from presenting something that was very high priority on our side. missile defense doesn't do the trick because missile defense destabilizes our nuclear relations with china and the soviet union. with russia. that means you create a bigger problem in the process of trying to deal with the north korean problem. the collateral aspects of the north korean problem are deterrence works. we know that in terms of state actors, but north korea is a despicable regime and the more that the sanctions were, the more desperate baby, for any sort of cash input or other types of inputs they can get. that means as they have nuclear capability, the danger of their getting nuclear capability into the hands of nonstate actors who cannot be deterred effectively become the big danger. the second is the danger that north korea is a regime that has no respect in were in the world,
and, therefore, to permit that type of regime continue any nuclear status why respectable regimes don't have nuclear weapons create big problems. and so, therefore, there is no question that the pressures for proliferation will get worse, and we need a more effective way to giving with that and the simple old structure of the npt, which in the modern world no longer has a credible basis for it, which is some countries can have nuclear weapons and some agreed it will not have nuclear weapons. that's broken down because the technology is to widespread now and countries are technically capable of getting nuclear weapons now and we've are received that with india and pakistan and potentially others out there. so our prioritization it seems to me isn't quite right. we can't negotiate the new
gratian because that has zero credibility. we've got to negotiate a cap on their program and that involves trade-offs. then we have to live with a despicable regime for an indefinite period of time until hopefully changes in leadership, changes in the nature of the regime create an opportunity to try to deal with. it's an impossible wax not necessarily. iran, for example, is an example where the leadership emerged and amanda wanted to enter isolation ship, the isolation any convincing way and were able to get the inadequate but better than nothing nuclear agreement with the iranians. in other words, was a basis for negotiations. the moment we don't have a credible basis for negotiations with the north koreans, and so it seems to be so now we have to structure those elements together but we will increase our frustration if we keep
putting this in terms of a realistic near-term possibility of denuclearization which is clearly an long, long process requiring regime change that cannot be and is by outside intervention, but might occur tomorrow because of our lack of knowledge about the internal stability of the regime. but at a minimum we need to talk sensibly about the issue and not let ourselves get off into these fantasies about we can somehow forced the chinese to force the north koreans to give us something that they consider vital for their national security. >> can i just say one thing? i think it was outstanding, great comments, really great. two comments. i totally agree, this is not one or two, he could be five, ten, a few decades to get if we look at comprehensive verifiable reversible dismantlement.
kat is a first step but there are deliverables with the caprica are deliverables because we have a number of military exercises and i think even north koreans allude to it. maybe you could scale back what you and sanctions maybe you could sort of give us a little relief on one or two of the sanctions and so forth. maybe an intersection to show that some dialogue. there are some intermediate steps we can take to start to do what we don't have, and that we have no trust in the relationship. we have absolutely zero trusted they don't trust as can we don't trust it. it's not building some sort of relationship but i think your points are outstanding. >> mr. donald smith. >> thank you. some of my questions have been answered.
just recently joined this conversation, but my basic question is what would china like to get out of this crisis? with the like a denuclearize korean peninsula? whawith you like the kim regime removed, or is there objective something else? >> my personal view? >> yes. >> in north korea similar to what kim jong-il, kim il-sung and kim jong-un could have but it denuclearize north korea. nuclear weapons in north korea will lend itself to strife in the region and beyond the region as we see right now. the status quo with the kim jong-un government, that is respectful to china, that depends heavily on china, and the china that has a 1961 peace and friendship treaty that china is committed to, but a
denuclearize north korea. i think that's what china would like. they certainly don't want, my personal view, reunification has to be way down the line. because they do not, i think it's fair to say, i think the concern has to be if there is reunification on south korea's terms, that would bring the u.s. potentially into the north and that would be part of a a discussion that would have to be separate with china. >> is there a possibility we could agree to some of these objectives that china may want it we would agree to remove our troops from south korea? >> i'm sure there's a dialogue going on with china as we speak. there's a question on that. when we speak about the troops in south korea, this has been something that's very sensitive to our south korean ally. because our commitment is to south korea and we all remember the korean war and what that entails and so forth so this is not a discussion between the united states and china in my personal view.
it has to be the discussion with our ally south korea at the table. >> paul. >> thank you. i'm the executive director of the center for the national interest. it's kind of interesting to me that we are a little bit converging on a new version of the containment that we used against the soviet union. but it kind of provokes a question for me because there is one really important difference between the soviet union and north korea, and we've been talking about it for the last several minutes. there was no other state that was willing and able to bail out the soviet union at the point when it was ready to collapse. and in this case of course there
is actually a state that is abe and willing to do that. and it has been doing that for a certain amount of time. at the same time we could kind of take the view we don't really want north korea to collapse. we want north korea to just evolve in a graduate overtime and in a direction that is more open in tripoli and it more open in its relations with many of our allies and others in the region. but i also wonder to what extent if that's in the interest of this external power, that has the capability to shape, to lease to some extent north korea's evolution. i guess my question in brief is, we've been talking about a frustrating problem and basically saying the answer is
to wait. is waiting a solution? >> the only, i would make on that, china, there is that piece of friendship treaty, kept, the lips and teeth and goes right back to kim il-sung and the korean war and china feels they invested heavily in north korea and they still deal on that. that's the reality, and to do with what we have, i think back to the literature on the agreed framework, with the passing of kim il-sung, the government would sort of fate and it would be regime change and things would be different.
i think we learned from that we have to deal with the reality we have now. the reality we have now is kim jong-un who is on a path to becoming an existential nuclear threat to the u.s. doing all the above, china having a lot of leverage it also china realizing that they can't use all those levers because one, i was in china would want to still have some sort of a normal relationship with north korea where they could maybe possibly influence them, a belly someone there there who can influence them. so it's a very complex, a very dynamic issue, but it think those are good points. >> general boyd. [inaudible] i led the delegation to north korea in 2009, a small group of
members -- [inaudible] and it was a trip that took several years to put together dealing with the north korean representative. and while i emphasized that what we were about was our interest in matters of security, and although i was bringing business people that we were not coming to do business, i probably emphasized that a dozen times at least, maybe more. and they never really heard what i was saying. and when we arrived there in a very elaborate dinner on the first evening of our presence,
it became clear that they believed we were there to do business. and so i had to make a very strong statement in the presence at that point. we have not come to do business. and moreover,, nobody else in the world is going to come to do that either less we find a satisfactory resolution to this problem. we were immediately in a crisis, and by the next day, it was not clear exactly what the outcome was going to be. so i got together privately with the chaff that was at the head of their delegation and they said we can get on the airplane and leave, or we can stay here and spin the amount of time that we planned to be year trying to get to know each other better. and faced with that, that's
exactly what we ended up doing. i want to say, this is probably the most bizarre, i've been dealing with people in various governments for a very long time -- >> including bizarre people. >> but this, but in the end it became clear that while they eventually realized we were not there to do business, the importance of foreign direct investment to them was absolutely -- it did not exceed the determination i think to keep their nuclear program. remember, this was kim jong-il, a different world. that's what i'm saying, but that was terribly important thing and it came through in a variety of ways. i don't know if you give up on the idea that we will never get them to give up their nuclear program.
is there a way we can rationalize their behavior through opportunity to become involved in the international business community? i don't know how to do that, mind you, that there are smarter people than i hear. is there a way to back off from all of the world of sanctions in trying to isolate them further and further and further, and actually give them an opportunity to become a member of the international community, while simultaneously maintaining a deterrent capability that is present and visible and understandable? >> so what you just given my you and i will look to my colleagues, a scenario for sitting down and having a discussion. because you made a case, and the
one thing i would add to that is if they sat down to you what you just said, but while they're being that could not launch a missile, having a test and what have you, that would be a pretty powerful presentation to me on direct investment don't open it up, open up aspects, showing them there's another path, another path. and you mentioned capping the program but not accepting the fact they were always retains a stick of weapons for stopping the proliferation. further nuclear weapons with the goal of eventually seeking eventually down the road to get comprehensive verifiable dismantlement. but you've given them a path and i think that's the value of having discussion of that's why some of us when we have these track two, 1.5 discussions we get into putting a lot of the
table but then needs to be done in an informal official channel, on current officials. >> nuclear weapons, missiles and sanctions aside, this could open up the possibility of some interesting conversations. this is an extraordinarily difficult investment environment. it's a government that has defaulted on its foreign debt. this is a government that has x appropriate south korean companies, samsung for example, chinese guppies are having a tough time. they tend to take your hostage, the infrastructure is in bad shape, investment has to be frontloaded. of course we have documented the use of forced labor, prison labor in north korea as extractive industry, minerals, call. perhaps indeed this would create the possibility of initiating a conversation on all of those difficult topics. again, it comes down to the
difficult aspect that this is a very tough investment environment. chinese investment in north korea has been, if i may say so, more business motivated based on more of an economic rationale that south korean investment, for example, in the industrial zone which is now no longer operational or the tourism project. >> yes, ma'am. >> this will be the closing comment. >> my dear. i'm not sure this question is worthy of the closing shot but i would like to associate myself with the remarks, general. it's the friday situation right now to have a north korea in possession of such extraordinarily distractive dese capabilities but anything more frightening than that is a country that has absolutely
nothing left to lose. i would really hope that if these negotiations go for we're not going to change society overnight. it didn't happen in the soviet union for a very long time. i guess my question is for this group, what is the timeline we are working against the we have to produce results in five years or is a good enough to produce results in 15 or 20, 20 or 30? understand the timeline that we are working against strikes me as critical. >> i think anyone who is working this issue, and i look to greg and general gregson, but anyone who is working this issue and i've been doing it since 2003, realizes this is a long-term effort. we just need to start building that trust. we need to stop the escalation where seeing and we need to start moving forward and reversing it. what we're seeing now is just the opposite.
it's become that much more dangerous because of the proliferation, that vitriolic commentaries and some of the other actions. >> i think it's important to continue to believe in transformation and the power of transformation. it is important to apply all elements of national power, diplomacy of course must never be forgotten. information has been mentioned several times i both general gregson and the ambassador. i think it is very important to have the patience to induce, perhaps transformation from within, come from the very people of north korea, as difficult and daunting a task as that might be. >> george schultz used to provide problems into two types, widest problems to be solved and the others problems to be worked. he characterized the second one like gardening, it never ends and i think that's what we are into now. with that we are adjourned. thank you.
[applause] >> thank you all for your patience. >> positive note, i like that. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> once congress returns next week reports say the senate will vote on the latest bill to change the health care law. watch live coverage of the house on c-span and the senate on c-span two. the house and senate also expected to take up legislation reauthorizing funding for a children's health program. we also expect them to take up faa program funding. both schip and faa programs are set to expire on september 30.
>> next a panel discussion on the future of terrorism. panos looked at the role youthfully in the strategy of terror groups revisited part of the conference hosted by the partisan policy institute examining the evolution of terrorism since 9/11 and the effectiveness of the u.s. counterterrorism strategies. this is 45 minutes. >> and being mindful of the jampacked, jampacked schedule we have today, i want to quit and transition right, right to our next panel as governor kane said, it's important to argue once in a while reassess the nature of the threat and as kevin mccall said, even as the caliphate is collapsing the threat persists, and discussed with the threat looks like going forward, what we can expect from isis, al-qaeda and other terrorist groups and what the prospects are further radicalization are given conditions on the ground in the middle east. wherever really expert panel for you today. i will go in alphabetical order